Last several decades have shown a steady broadening of national security issues' spectrum along with an increase in the strictness of international competition driven by advances in high technologies and other factors. National security agenda is nowadays comprised not only of defense issues per se, but also includes economic, social, cultural and other aspects. All this is strongly influenced by the technological trends and the very possession of critical technologies has become a pressing national security issue. Thus, we are witnessing a gradual convergence of national security and technological agendas. Advocating a proactive approach to tackling national security risks of a technological nature, the authors make an attempt to outline the contemporary innovative methodology of assessing, harnessing and counteracting such risks. Their key recommendation lies in the appeal for joining the forces of theorists and practitioners in the field of both national security and science, technology and innovation (STI) policy to overcome the corresponding challenges.
Introduction
Analysing technologies' effect on national and international security, particular attention is frequently paid to their impact on the country's military and economic strength -and as a result, on the changing balance of power in the world [1] [2] [3] [4] .
Fully mature technologies are primarily subjected to such analysis for they are the ones that mostly affect the society and its overall security in the short run. But as soon as a technology becomes mature, it becomes less susceptible to change and to external impact -which increases political controversy between those who wish to maintain the status quo, and proponents of more active application of innovations 5 .
Such controversy is put on the agenda in the form of challenges and threats associated with the use of the already existing technologies, and potential challenges and threats posed by the emerging technologies. A sectio aurea principle should be kept in mind therefore and overestimating potential threats from emerging technologies for instance may negatively affect country's innovation potential 6 . Evidence shows, that this can occasionally result in countries' lagging behind in developing new technologies and their innovative breakthroughs only happen when external challenges outweigh the internal controversy 7 .
Correctly assessing emerging challenges posed by advanced technologies requires moving on from analysing their revolutionary effect on the society to studying more complex, not always linear, and chronologically extended technology development trajectories, and their impact on the society 8 . At the same time analysis of challenges and threats which result from inadequate application of existing, and unsatisfactory development of innovative breakthrough technologies, must be integrated into the overall framework for economic, political, and social development.
During the previous decades a trend towards relocation of production facilities to emerging Asian nations became apparent. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the contribution of Asian economies (except Japan) into the global economy in 2014 will amount to 29,6% 9 . It should be noted that in 1820 Asia (except Japan) generated 56,2% of the global GDP 10 . The accelerating industrial revolution in the Western Europe became a key factor of the Asian economies' declining role. In the middle of the 20 th century their share declined to 15,5% 10 .
Asia started to reclaim its positions in the 1970s, when productivity growth in developed economies began to slow down. If in 1891-1972 (the period of accelerated development of the second 4 industrial wave's technologies, such as electric energy, communications, chemistry, etc.) labour productivity in the USA grew by 2,36% a year, in 1972-2013 the relevant figure was only 1,39% 11 . Automated production technologies developed in the 1940s -1950s didn't have a significant effect on productivity growth during the second half of the 20 th century, due to their immaturity 12 . In 1987 Robert Solow, Nobel prize winner for developing economic growth theory, noted that "you can find evidence of computer era anywhere but in productivity statistics" 13 .
As early as in the 1960s, American companies started to relocate labour-intensive production to
Asian countries, in the subsequent decades followed by more complex production processes such as plate manufacturing and certain R&D operations 14 . But proximity to production processes promotes emergence of new ideas to further develop these processes and products 15 . E.g. in 2009 American production companies' R&D expenditures amounted to 70% of all American R&D costs 16 . Innovations followed the production facilities. If in the 1990s Asia's share in global R&D expenditures (except Japan) was 13,2%, according to the Economist Intelligence
Unit's forecast, in 2016 it will reach 33,8% 17 .
Relocating production abroad allows to quickly achieve tactical objectives. E.g. companies who've already experienced revenue reduction problems were more willing to move offshore [18] . Still, in the longer term offshoring is not always the most efficient solution: (1) saving on cheap labour has its limits; (2) increased distances between production and R&D facilities negatively affect intellectual property, while (3) the middle class emerging in the developing countries creates new markets 18 . Now companies wish to quickly enter new markets, make personalised products, and quickly react to changing demand on local markets.
These days companies have new requirements to products and their distribution techniques. In the 1960s -1970s, against the background of the first wave of emerging information technologies (IT), companies automated specific processes of their value creation chains; with the progress of the internet they've merged these processes into integrated systems, and now IT are becoming integral components of products 19 . Traditional product components -hardware and software -are now supplemented with connectivity. Connectivity allows to exchange information between the product and its manufacturer, user, and other systems.
The need to process data quickly forces companies to organise their production and management process in a different way. The "lean production system" is becoming increasingly popular, whose roots lie in Toyota's production system; it allows to increase labour and capital productiv-ity 20 . Software products reduce complexity of organisation processes and open opportunities for integrating people and robots into production. Closer integration between production of equipment and software allows to reduce complexity of the physical world, and deal with emerging problems "with atoms or bits" 21 . Productivity is increased by optimising product teams' work "bottom-up" 22 .
Another source of competitiveness is more efficient use of natural resources. Their production costs are growing, and localisation of production processes coupled with increasing environment pollution are accelerating this trend even further 23 . Companies must reconsider their approaches to optimising their use of natural resources.
Thus three areas connected with technological development were identified (see Attachment A), which will significantly affect national security: (1) development and application of advanced production and organisation technologies; (2) technologies for efficient utilisation of resources;
and (3) development of human capital.
For each area, top 10 technologies were selected, to be validated though situational analysiswhich will allow to formulate specific political recommendations to minimise threats to Russia's national security connected with insufficiently developed advanced technological structures, including possible "asymmetrical responses".
Technological gap and Russia's national security
The National Security Strategy for the Russian Federation until 2020 24 defines national security as "a state of affairs when individuals, the society, and the country are protected from internal and external threats, which allows to provide constitutional rights, liberties, decent quality and level of life, ensure sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable development for the Russian Federation, defence and security of the country". This secure state primarily depends on the country's and society's ability to adapt to external (and partially to internal) challenges, and make use of opportunities these environments provide to protect vital interests of individuals, the society, and the country mentioned in the above definition -i.e. rights and liberties, decent quality and level of life, sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable development for Russia, its defence and security.
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Thus its ability to adapt to changing external environment and to the challenges and opportunities it creates that ultimately defines any country's national security, including Russia. Of utmost importance here is timely monitoring, analysis, and forecasting of challenges' and opportunities' nature and direction (which rapidly change, especially in recent times), and the country's ability to shape policies oriented towards the current and future -as opposed to the past -challenges.
To successfully prepare for the last war guarantees losing the next one. If the government policy is targeting challenges of yesterday, which by now have disappeared or due to various reasons became irrelevant, that at the very least would result in wasting increasingly scarce financial and human resources, and make the country less secure against the current and future threats.
At the same time the nature of challenges is directly connected with development of technologies. Firstly, technological progress creates new tools, formats, and platforms for international competition; note that as S&T progress accelerates, the areas of more intense competition also change more rapidly, and countries frequently turn out to be unprepared for that. Technological development (evolutionary and abrupt alike) is the main driver of external environment's changes -adapting to which, and transforming which according to the country's interests, are the main goals of national security policy.
Therefore having various technological gaps with other nations dooms the country to lose in relevant competitive areas, and hinders its adaptation to the changing environment -thus making it insecure to new risks and threats. Particularly dramatic consequences arise if the country "oversleeps" not just emergence of a specific new competitive area, but a new round of S&T revolution, emergence of a new technology structure. An example is the collapse of the USSR which relatively successfully competed with the West in the arms race, but had hopelessly lagged behind in cybernetics and ICT.
Secondly, technological development in itself increases countries' "muscle" potential, being the main driver of changing the balance of forces in the world; thus it creates risks to countries whose international positions deteriorate as a result of this process. ties and skills, and increase the requirements people make to the government -which is not always able to meet them (not by a long shot). This results in a crisis of confidence in the government and in the so-called "loyalty deficit", occasionally leading to a political crisis. The country's (and its institutions') ability to adapt plays a crucial role here -the ability to change quickly enough and produce the social benefits the society begins to require as a result of the technological progress.
Thirdly, there's a group of technologies which themselves significantly affect specific segments of national security. These are the technologies heads of the RF national security agencies should pay the most attention to. Particular risks to national security emerge if the country starts lagging behind in developing these technologies. Such gaps sharply reduce its potential in the areas which will define its international positions, and increase the country's vulnerability to external environment. Meanwhile the competition get new opportunities to weaken the country even further.
Relevant examples again are plentiful. The USSR's lagging behind in ICT and cyberneticswhich were among the highest-growth sectors of the global economy in the 1980s and 1990s -determined the overall crisis and then the downfall of the centrally planned economy, the socialist economies' increasing gap with the West, and as a consequence, the collapse of the country.
Many energy exporting countries' (including Russia) lagging behind in high-technology energy generation (such as development of slate, shale, and hard-to-reach fields, "green" energy, etc.)
simultaneously creates risks of reduced production of Russian energy resources, and shrinking of markets for Russian energy exports, with increased competition in the global energy sector. This in turn poses a challenge to stability of Russian energy exports, and potentially can lead to a significant reduction of the country's revenues. The gap between Russia and other countries in agriculture increases its dependency on imports of more competitive agricultural products -thus undermining the nation's food security and generally making it more vulnerable to external chal-8
lenges. An example of such dependency is the situation which has emerged on the domestic Russian food market, and in Russia's relations with Eurasian integration partners after Moscow limited imports of various agricultural products from Western countries.
Accordingly, the following seems to be quite important to achieving national security: a) identifying technologies and technology groups most relevant to national security (in this case Russia's); b) out of them, identifying areas where Russia lags behind the leaders; c) identifying related risks and threats; and d) identifying steps to be taken to overcome the risks (see Annex 1).
The changing nature of security
The nature of challenges and threats to Russia's security was lately undergoing through fundamental transformation -which in turn was a result of radical transformation of international competition. Firstly, the competition -between everybody with everybody else -is becoming significantly tougher. It's not just competition between "old" Western and "new" non-Western centres of gravity, but also between the great powers -members of the same group. The sharp aggravation of relations between Russia and the West in 2014, which have already deteriorated into a systemic confrontation (especially with the USA) makes this competition particularly severe, and raises the sides' stakes (especially for Russia).
Secondly, and most importantly, the spheres where competition becomes particularly tough and crucial for the international situation and security, are also changing. From the military sphere competition now flows into the economic, humanitarian, and information spheres.
The military sphere and the need to maintain the defence potential of course remain important.
Military power is still the main factor which ultimately ensures countries' survival. However, due to such factors as nuclear weapons (which minimise the probability of war between the great powers), and political awakening of people (which reduces the ability to control other countries and peoples through use of military force, or achieve sustainable political results using it), military power ceased to be the factor which primarily determines countries' position on the international arena, their political influence, and stability against external challenges.
The rate and the quality of economic growth, the ability to present an attractive image and lead in information rivalry, countries' stability in the most survival-wise important areas (such as food, energy), and the quality of human capital are increasingly becoming the determining factors of that kind. Therefore they predominantly define countries' security, and gaps in this areas create -and will continue to create in the foreseeable future -the biggest threats and challenges to Russia's security. That's where the toughest competition is taking place.
A vivid illustration of the role economic growth and its quality play in achieving security is the major shift in the balance of forces which took place in the early 21 st century: the rise of non- At the same time the USA and the West still dominate in the information and media sphere.
Their ability to create and present an attractive image is one of the main factors of their international influence in the world, which is now much more polycentric than it used to be. This potential allows the USA and the West to set the global political agenda, to establish rules and the mood in the media favourable for them, artificially increasing the potential of certain players (including themselves) while presenting others weaker than they are, and to pursue their political and economic interests through information campaigns and warfare -by setting appropriate agendas for the world's mass media. An example of the latter is the political crisis and the coup d'état in Ukraine in 2014, which was largely caused by targeted media campaign to support "Euromaidan" and discredit and blackmail the then Ukrainian authorities.
Another example of countries' vulnerability to media campaigns and to narratives thrust upon people by international mass media -and of how that vulnerability may turn out to be fatal to 10 national security -are the events of the "Arab spring". The regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria were simply not able to counter the information warfare which has mobilised their populations for mass protest and riots. Note that mass protests have recently become an almost universal phenomenon, common to developing countries (and among those, both the weak ones, and the new emerging centres of power) and developed nations alike.
A good illustration of the toughest competition's shifting from the military to the economic, information, and humanitarian areas is the pressure the West is currently applying to Russia be- 
Components of Russia' national security
According to the changes in the nature of security threats described above, five areas can be identified which most significantly affect Russia's security, the situation in which in turn is defined by Russia's technological development or lack thereof.
Rate and quality of Russia's economic growth
This area includes the following components:
 Economic growth rate. Today, leadership and influence in the world, countries' ability to present an attractive growth model directly depend on their economic growth rate. High growth rate also enables countries to accumulate financial reserves, solve socio-economic problems, implement important infrastructural projects. Economic diversification is also closely connected with technological progress.
 Availability of all relevant production inputs (natural, human, and financial resources, developed R&D system, access to external markets and a high-capacity domestic market, transport infrastructure).
Thus the rate and quality of economic growth directly depend on development and application of advanced production and organisation technologies, on Russia's leading or, on the contrary, lagging behind the world leaders in developing technologies which are now, and will continue to be in the short to medium term, the most important ones for achieving high quantitative and qualitative parameters of economic growth.
Energy security
According to the Russian Energy Strategy Until 2030 approved on 13 November, 2009, 25 energy security is defined as "a state of affairs when the country, its citizens, the society, the state, and the economy are protected from threats to reliable fuel and energy supply". The document also describes the main energy security parameters: sufficient supply of resources, economic availability of resources, environmental and technological admissibility of their exploitation. Each of these parameters is directly relevant to technological development, and to Russia's lagging behind the world leaders in certain technological areas important for the parameters.
It would make sense to add to these parameters retaining the existing and entering new markets for Russian fuel and energy products; adopting such a management regime for energy markets which would best reflect Russian interests; and energy efficiency. Adding these seems to be important considering the role the fuel and energy sector is playing in the Russian economy and in the structure of the federal budget revenues. Losing some of the energy export markets, or accepting an unfavourable model of Russia's energy relations with partners, would create major risks for the country's economic stability and development. In turn, energy efficiency directly affects survival, sustainability, and competitiveness of the fuel and energy sector, especially in the medium to long term; ability to increase supply of energy resources through their more efficient production and usage; and increase exports through more efficient use of energy inside the country. According to the strategy, the unrealised potential for energy saving through organisational and technological measures amounts up to 40% of the total internal Russian energy consumption.
Ability to implement these parameters also directly depends on the Russian fuel and energy sec- 
Food security
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By its very nature, availability of food is a key national security factor. Chronic shortage of food in the USSR in the 1970s -1980s played the primary role in the crisis of the socialist development model, losing the competition with the capitalist world, the union's demise and collapse.
The population took the USSR breakdown quite lightly not because it was against the idea of the union state within the 1991 borders, but because it (the breakdown) was perceived as a natural "by-product" of moving on to market economy -which people expected to be able to "fill the shelves in shops".
The Russian Federation's Food Security Doctrine of 30 January, 2010 26 defines food security as "a state of affairs in the country and in the economy when the Russian Federation's food independence is assured; physical and economic availability of food products matching the requirements of the Russian Federation laws on technical regulation is guaranteed to each citizen, in the amounts no less than reasonably required for active and healthy lifestyle". The document clearly states that food security is one of the most important national security aspects, a major element of the country's demographic and social policy, and a factor of maintaining national sovereignty.
The Doctrine indicates that to ensure its food security, Russia must maintain the following threshold shares for domestically produced agricultural, fishery, and food products in the total turnover on the relevant domestic markets: grain at least 95%; sugar at least 80%; vegetable oil at least 80%; meat and meat products (in meat equivalents) at least 85%; milk and dairy products (in milk equivalents) at least 90%; fishery products at least 80%; potatoes at least 95%; white salt at least 85%.
Food security directly depends on technological development. The Doctrine clearly states that one group of risks to Russia's food security is "technological risks caused by lagging behind developed countries in terms of technological level of the Russian production capacity; different requirements to food safety, and to a system for monitoring and controlling compliance with them".
Information security
The current understanding of information security includes two major aspects. The first is ability to set the media agenda, to present images and dominate in global media, to successfully wage information warfare and counter information campaigns by the opposition. The second is cybersecurity: ability to protect information and data (ranging from individuals' personal bank cards to national-level information constituting state secrets), and security of automated production and technological processes' management and control systems at crucial infrastructures.
Both these components are becoming extremely relevant and important for national security as a whole. The information sphere is becoming a major area of countries' competition with each other; information campaigns and warfare are turning into efficient tools for internal destabilisation and even destruction of countries (like in the case of Syria), and weakening them internationally (the media campaign against Russia which began even before the coup d'état in Ukraine). And cyber-attacks today are a much more reliable way to bleed and disarm countries than "classic" military action.
According to the Russian Information Security Doctrine approved on 9 September, 2000, information security is broadly defined as "the state of affairs when the country's national interests in the information sphere, which are determined by the sum of balanced interests of individuals, the society, and the state, are protected" 27 . The interests of the state in this sphere are defined as "creating conditions for harmonious development of Russian information infrastructure, for exercising human and civil constitutional rights and liberties concerning accessing and using information, in order to ensure stability of Russia's constitutional system, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, its political, economic, and social stability, unconditionally ensure the rule of law, law and order, and promote mutually beneficial international cooperation".
According to this document, Russian national interests in the information security area include, among other things, "information support of the Russian Federation's national policy, to provide to Russian and international public reliable information about the Russian Federation's national policy"; "development of advanced information technologies and the Russian information industry, including informatisation and telecommunication technologies"; and "protection of information resources from unauthorised access; ensuring security of information and telecommunication systems". Accordingly, among threats to Russia's information security were mentioned disabling Russian state media's activities aimed at informing Russian and international public about Russian policy and its assessment of international events; their low efficiency due to various reasons; and unauthorised access to Russian information and communication networks and databases. Securing these interests and minimising these threats directly involves technologies, primarily ICT.
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Various cybersecurity-related issues are described in more detail in the document entitled "The main aspects of the national policy on security of automated production and technological processes' management and control systems for crucial infrastructures in the Russian Federation", approved on 3 February, 2012. Security of crucial information infrastructures is defined as "the overall state of crucial information infrastructure components, under which subjecting it to computer attacks does not result in heavy adverse consequences". And practically any way to increase this security has a completely technological nature; these include development of Russian ICTs, and minimising (as far as possible) dependence on foreign technologies.
Quality of human capital
Quality of human capital is a fundamental factor which ultimately determines countries' national security and their place in the international system. It includes several components, the most important being the population's health (which in turn is determined by environmental risks and level of the healthcare system), and education, which affects not just the population's skill level but their morals, civil conscience, legal culture, and other factors vitally important to the country's security and wealth. Thus factors which most profoundly affect the quality of human capital as the foundation of national security, include: the development level and the efficiency of the healthcare system; ability to minimise environmental risks to people's health; and the education level.
All three these areas are directly connected with technological progress, and each of them poses risks in case the RF lags behind the world leaders in developing critical technologies. Thus quality of healthcare is directly affected by technological development, and a gap in this sphere not only creates additional risks to the population's health -due to inability to treat certain diseases -but also increases the country's dependency on importing foreign-made drugs and equipment, which, if the international situation deteriorates and such supplies are terminated, may put to risk stable operation of the healthcare system. The country's ability to minimise environmental risks to people's health also is directly determined by the level of technologies required to minimise harmful emissions, manage industrial waste, make production and transport systems more environmentally friendly.
Finally, the level and quality of education are also closely interconnected with technological development. On one hand, certain technologies, first of all ICT, create new opportunities for education (distant learning, increased access to literature, etc.). On the other hand, the country's abil-
Conclusions and discussion
Currently, all countries, including Russia, are faced with brand new global challenges related to fundamental changes in production processes, transformation of socio-economic processes, cultural values and the redistribution of profit in global value chains. New technologies and their corresponding markets are constantly emerging and evolving. At the same time the scope of national security issues has broadened significantly and now also includes economic, social, cultural, moral, ethical, ecological and other issues. These drive the adaptation of states to the changing global economic and political environment.
On one hand, technologies determine to an extent the emergence of new centers of power. On the other hand, technology issues begin to penetrate the political agenda as states try to tackle national security risks related to technological development. Thus, science, technology and innovation (STI) and national security agenda converge progressively which was discovered in the study.
In order to find practical and theoretically grounded solutions to technology related risks to national security one would need to bring together both policy-makers and scholars in the corresponding areas.
In reality it is not about treating technologies as a hostile element and trying to get rid of their impact. Quite the opposite, they need being tamed, harnessed and exploited to the limit for the maximal benefit of the society. Ultimately, it is in the scope of policy-makers' and scholars' responsibility to work together in order to solve challenges arising in the sphere of national security using STI policy instruments. 
ANNEX 1
Situational Analysis Methodology
The first step in the situational analysis, after the object of study has been determined (identifying and describing the main components of national security), is to identify their connections with technologies. This implies identifying technologies which most significantly affect each of the five national security areas.
In the course of the situational analysis the Scenario Group developed a special methodology for identifying technology groups which have major effect on the rate and quality of economic growth, energy security, food security, information security, and quality of human capital, based on the nested matrices technique. Using this methodology, the Scenario Group obtained the following results.
The second step is to identify, out of the selected and presented above technologies, those in respect of which Russia is, firstly, already lagging behind the world leaders, and secondly, those where it potentially may begin to lag behind during the period until 2030.
Participants of the situational analysis are asked to comment on this selection and if necessary, indicate which technologies should be crossed out and which, on the contrary, added to it.
Participants of the situational analysis are also asked to identify technologies out of those most significantly affecting the five presented national security components, in respect of which Russia may lag behind the leaders during the period until 2030. Please name potential gap areas for each national security area, in the following format.:
 for economic development, Russia's potential lagging behind in developing the following technologies seems to be particularly important:_______  for energy security, Russia's potential lagging behind in developing the following technologies seems to be particularly important: _______
The third stage of the situational analysis is to identify and describe the risks which Russia's lagging behind (both actual and potential) in developing certain technologies creates to the relevant national security segment (each of the five). The risks should be identified for each national security area individually, i.e. their consideration should start from "national security segments", not from "technologies".
Since Russia's lagging behind in various technologies probably poses similar risks, participants of the situational analysis are not asked to identify risks for each specific technology.
Rather, it would make sense to identify the risks typical to Russia's lagging behind in respect of the technology groups relevant for particular national security areas (risks for economic development posed by Russia's lagging behind in ICT; risks for education posed by Russia's lagging behind in ICT; etc.).
Identifying the risks posed by Russia's lagging behind in developing specific technologies would be useful if such risks were different from the ones typical for the respective technology group, and potentially could significantly damage Russia's national security.
Risks should be identified and analysed in the following format (Tab. 1):
Tab. As at the previous stages, the recommendations should be developed for each specific national security area individually.
The last stage of the situational analysis is to identify the effect of the Western countries'
(USA, EU) unilateral sanctions on Russia's lagging behind in technologies which are particularly important for its national security.
As at the previous stages, the analysis will be conducted for each national security area individually.
Specifically, the situational analysis participants will be asked to answer the following 
